Occupational Health and Safety of Temporary and Agency Workers by Hopkins, Benjamin
 
 
University of Birmingham
Occupational Health and Safety of Temporary and
Agency Workers
Hopkins, Benjamin
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Hopkins, B 2015, 'Occupational Health and Safety of Temporary and Agency Workers', Economic and Industrial
Democracy, vol. 38, no. 4.
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Mar. 2020
 
 
Occupational Health and Safety of Temporary and Agency Workers 
 
Introduction 
 
The majority of studies into the Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) of precarious workers 
have found that these workers have poorer OHS outcomes (see, for example, Quinlan et al., 
2001; Quinlan, 2003, for meta-analyses).  However, within this diverse group we find both 
directly-employed temporary workers and those engaged through an employment agency.  
The latter group face a specific set of issues, notably the lack of legal clarity as to who is 
responsible for their OHS (Howes, 2011), coupled with an increasing diversification of the 
people taking this type of work (McDowell et al., 2008).  With the use of in-depth 
ethnographically-informed study, this paper aims to investigate the underlying cultural causes 
of differences in OHS outcomes for these groups.  Drawing on the work of Hopkins (2005) 
who identifies four cultural practices which influence the creation, or impediment, of cultures 
of safety, agency workers are found to experience inadequate safety training, provision of 
poor quality personal protective equipment, and a lack of clarity of responsibility for their 
supervision. 
 
Divisions between core and temporary workers 
 
A growing body of literature has investigated a variety of outcomes for those workers who 
are considered to be precarious.  Within this group of workers we find people on a variety of 
 
 
different contracts, including those who work on a temporary basis, but are directly-
employed, and also those who are engaged on a short-term basis through an employment 
agency.  When first considering temporary workers, it is found that, as well as experiencing 
poorer working conditions based on factors such as pay and job stability (Deutsch, 2005; Eib 
et al., 2014), resulting in lower levels of job satisfaction and organisational commitment 
(Author et al., 2014; Vujičić et al., 2014), this group have also been found to receive lower 
levels of training, notably in induction (Kochan et al., 1994; Selcraig, 1992).  Managerial 
models such as Atkinson’s (1985) core-periphery model divide workers on contractual status, 
suggesting that these temporary workers should be engaged on a transactional rather than 
relational basis (Williamson and Ouchi 1983; Williamson 1985, 1996) and be utilised to 
create numerical flexibility.  Where workers have low levels of uniqueness of their human 
capital, or as Stewart (1997:90) puts it “one job-holder is pretty much as good as another”, 
organisations will purchase workers on a short term contract and then invest little in training 
as the jobs that they are performing do not require high levels of skill. 
 
Potentially linked to these lower levels of training, a review of over fifty works investigating 
the link between contractual status and OHS (Quinlan et al., 2001) finds that the majority of 
studies record a positive link between precarious employment and injury rates.  A further 
study by Quinlan (2003) again found that the majority of the studies reviewed found a link 
between precarious work and safety.  However, it should be noted that these meta-analyses 
do reveal some conflicting findings.  In explaining why there may be a difference in OHS 
outcomes based on contractual status, Gunningham (2008) notes that in high risk sectors, 
such as mining, workers have faced the dual threat of dwindling trade union representation, 
and increasingly precarious work.  Robinson and Smallman (2006) find that in the 
manufacturing sector there is a correlation between the presence of a trade union and a lower 
 
 
injury rate, particularly where there is a specific occupational health and safety 
representative. However, trade unions have often been opposed to temporary and agency 
workers, with few showing the development from exclusion to engagement noted by 
MacKenzie (2009).  
 
Divisions between directly-employed and agency workers 
 
Agency workers present a particular case of temporary work, and therefore their OHS 
outcomes may be different to directly-employed temporary workers (Underhill and Quinlan, 
2011).  When considering agency workers, Lloyd and James (2008) argue that the use of 
agency workers has two effects on health and safety – firstly that new workers are more 
likely to have an incident in the workplace as a result of unfamiliarity with the environment, 
and secondly that they are less likely to be in trade unions (Ackers et al., 1996) and therefore 
have less representation with regard to health and safety issues.  Agency workers may be 
unaware of the processes for reporting potential hazards or near misses (Aronsson, 1999; 
Johnstone and Quinlan, 2006) and, perhaps more importantly, may be unwilling to criticise 
the company at which they are working as they do not wish to jeopardise their chances of 
renewing their contracts under a triangular employment relationship (Forde and Slater, 2005; 
2006; Koene et al., 2004; Smith and Neuwirth, 2008). 
 
A particular problem for agency workers is the lack of legal clarity over who is responsible 
for their training and OHS.  The legal status of temporary workers has been contested in 
many different nations around the world, as noted, for example in Lamare et al.’s (2014) 
 
 
study in New Zealand.  Within the European Union, Howes (2011) notes that there remains a 
lack of clear understanding as to who is responsible for OHS of agency workers owing to the 
complexities of the triangular employment relationship.  This responsibility may be seen to 
be either of the agency or of the end-user or, in some cases, of the individual worker 
themselves.  Interestingly, advice from the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) for agency 
workers in the United Kingdom notes the responsibilities of workers themselves, and not just 
the agency and the organisation at which they are placed (HSE, 2014a).  The key pieces of 
European legislation aimed at ensuring equality of treatment for workers, including for health 
and safety issues, are identified as Directive 91/383/EEC and Directive 2008/104/EC.  
However, Howes (2011) states that this latter Directive represents a missed opportunity to 
clarify the employment status of agency workers and thus the responsibility for their health 
and safety.  Instead, domestic law has been left to each member state of the EU, resulting in 
the lack of clarity that affects so much of this triangular employment relationship. 
 
These issues of responsibility have further been noted by Rubery et al. (2002:645), who state 
that “The notion of a clearly defined employer–employee relationship becomes difficult to 
uphold under conditions where employees are working…on-site beside employees from other 
organizations, where responsibilities for performance and for health and safety are not clearly 
defined, or involve more than one organization.”  This confusion occurs where people can 
work for one organisation, but at another one across fragmented organisational boundaries 
(Marchington et al., 2005; Marchington and Vincent 2004; Rubery et al. 2002).  When this 
occurs, organisational responsibilities at even a very basic level, particularly around safety, 
may become unclear (Johnstone and Quinlan, 2006). 
 
 
 
Adding to this problem is the heterogeneity of this workforce, particularly when considering 
migrant workers (see, amongst others, Author et al., 2014; Author, 2014; Clark and 
Drinkwater, 2008; Curries, 2007; Holgate, 2005; Krings et al. 2011; Silla et al., 2005; 
Thompson et al., 2013; Wickham et al., 2009).  The issue of migrant workers has become 
particularly important in the UK since the A8 EU expansion of 2004 (see, for example, 
Anderson et al., 2006; Drinkwater et al., 2006; McDowell et al., 2008) when eight central and 
eastern European countries joined the EU.  Despite the prediction of the UK government that 
this would lead to an increase in migration of between eight thousand and thirteen thousand 
people to the UK (Dustmann et al., 2003), over six hundred thousand people from the A8 
nations registered to work in the UK within the first three years of accession (Cooley and 
Sriskandarajah, 2008), with over a million registering during the operation of the Worker 
Registration Scheme between 2004 and 2011.  As a result of low levels of English language 
skills, many of these workers have taken jobs through employment agencies, thus negating 
the need to pass an interview directly with an employing company through the medium of 
English (Author, 2009).  However, these lower levels of English language skills may have an 
effect on workplace OHS if these migrants cannot understand instructions and training related 
to their safety (Author, 2009).  This increasing diversity of workers, particularly amongst 
agency workers, has additional effects on workplace health and safety. 
 
Culture and OHS 
 
Despite these divisions across contractual status, an organisational culture which emphasises 
safety may aid in the reduction of safety risks for temporary and agency workers.  In 
Hopkins’ (2005) study of organisational cultures he states that “organisational culture is 
 
 
widely understood as the mindset of its individuals, but that it is better seen as the collective 
practices of an organisation” (2005: ix, emphasis in original).  Hopkins further notes the 
importance of leaders in creating an organisational culture which recognises the importance 
of safety, but that in many cases the actions of leaders within organisations relegates the 
importance of safety.  For example, an organisation may monitor their production levels in 
real time, while only producing safety reports on a monthly basis.  This is found by Antonsen 
(2009a) who, in a case study of the petrochemical sector, reports evidence of a focus on 
efficiency and production targets, rather than on safety.   
 
For leaders to create a safety culture, Reason (1997) notes four cultural practices that must be 
embedded within the organisation.  The first of these is a reporting culture, where near misses 
and unsafe procedures are reported as a matter of course.  Organisations cannot just expect 
workers to be risk aware, a process which merely shifts the responsibility of safety from firm 
to worker.  The firm must have a culture that means that reports are acted upon.  Secondly, 
there must be a just culture, where only recklessness or malice are met with blame.  If this is 
not the case, then people within the organisation will be deterred from reporting issues.  
There is a role here for regulators, but as noted by both Hopkins (2005) and Reason (2007) 
the commitment of an organisation’s top managers to creating a safety culture is of key 
importance.  Thirdly, Reason (1997) notes the importance of having a learning culture.  
Fourthly and finally, the importance of a flexible culture is recognised.  Under this culture, 
decisions will be made by people best equipped to make them, for example engineers rather 
than managers who may have little technical knowledge.  Antonsen (2009b) argues the 
importance of also considering the influence of power when researching safety (see also 
Perrow, 1984) as, for example, the views of managers towards safety is one from the top, and 
not the only, nor necessarily correct, view.  Further, Maslen and Hopkins (2014) note that 
 
 
organisations may concentrate their efforts on reducing major incidents affecting many 
people, one of the ‘unintended consequences’ of often well-meaning incentive schemes used 
by leaders to attempt to improve safety.  However, Vaughan (1996) notes the importance of 
not reducing the issue to one of a dichotomy of ‘good’ engineers and ‘bad’ managers.   
 
By comparison with Reason’s (1997) cultural practices which aid in the development of a 
safety culture, Hopkins (2005) notes four cultural practices that impede the development of a 
culture of safety.  The first of these is a rule focussed culture, with a “pronounced tendency to 
blame” (2005:28).  With a rule focussed culture, rules are in place to ensure that someone can 
be blamed and punished if something goes wrong, with blame passed on to the individual to 
protect the organisation.  Rules can deaden awareness of risk, as people are aware of the rule 
but not the danger that it seeks to control.  A second culture is one of punctuality and on-time 
running, a side effect of which is to undermine safety by demoting its importance as 
compared to production (see also Antonsen, 2009a).  Thirdly, there may be a risk-blind, or 
even risk-denying culture.  Risk-blindness indicates a lack of awareness of risk, whereas to 
deny risk shows some awareness of it.  In a culture of risk denial, the situation is assumed to 
be safe unless there is conclusive evidence to the contrary.  Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly when considering divisions across contractual status and organisational 
boundaries, is a culture of silos where a company is “organisationally and occupationally 
fragmented” (2005:28).  This leads to job demarcation and an attitude that “it’s not my job”, 
with secrecy, non-co-operation, restricted communication and antagonism between silos.  
Almklov and Antonsen (2010) also note the control issues created where additional barriers 
are created by outsourcing some functions.  Importantly, as previously noted, silos can be 
created by differentiating workers based on whether they are core or temporary, or when 
 
 
some are engaged by an agency, with lack of clarity over who is responsible for them across 
organisational boundaries (Howes, 2011; Rubery et al., 2002). 
 
In this context, the key contribution of this paper is to investigate differences in OHS 
outcomes for people employed as core, directly-employed temporary, and agency workers, 
and the influence of safety culture on these differing groups.  In order to achieve this, 
Hopkins (2006) notes that there are three ways to investigate safety cultures – either through 
culture surveys, major accident enquiries, or ethnography (or an ethnographically-informed 
approach).  It is the latter of these approaches used by this study. 
 
Methodology 
 
As reviewed above, a number of quantitative studies have been conducted investigating the 
potential link between contractual status and occupational health and safety (Quinlan et al., 
2001; Quinlan, 2003).  However, the increasingly complex relationship between worker and 
employer, particularly when considering agency workers, requires in-depth qualitative 
investigation in order to understand the workplace experiences of those at the margins (as 
also noted by Taylor et al., 2010; Thompson, 2011).  As such, this paper investigates worker 
experiences and OHS in the UK food manufacturing sector using in-depth qualitative 
research.  The unit of analysis for this study is the food manufacturing sector, and the study 
draws upon data from five different organisations, details of which are presented in Table 1.  
The five companies, respectively a chocolate factory, brewery, ready meals factory, herb and 
spice packer and poultry processor, are identified throughout this paper as ChocCo, BeerCo, 
ReadyCo, SpiceCo and TurkeyCo. 
 
 
 
Insert table 1 here 
 
In total, 88 semi-structured interviews were conducted, held with 32 operations and first line 
managers, 12 HR managers, 14 permanent workers, 16 directly-employed temporary 
workers, 12 agency workers, and 2 trade union representatives.  These interviewees were 
selected so as to give a representative view of managers, and also core, directly-employed 
temporary, and agency workers.  Throughout the rest of this paper, those workers employed 
directly by one of the case study companies on a temporary basis are referred to as 
‘temporary’, whereas those who work through an agency are denoted ‘agency’.  Great care 
was taken to ensure that the sample selected at each case study company was comparable 
with the wider workforce at each site in terms of gender, ethnicity, age, and other 
demographics.  Interviews were held with trade union representatives at BeerCo and 
TurkeyCo, the only two of the five companies to recognise a trade union, the effect of which 
on health and safety has been noted by Robinson and Smallman (2006) and Gunningham 
(2008). 
 
These interviews were supplemented by observation of between two and four weeks at each 
site, which allowed for views presented in the interviews to be compared with interactions in 
both production and recreational areas.  A number of shorter informal interviews were also 
conducted during the observation period.  OHS representatives were informally interviewed 
where present.  Each organisation had a preferred external agency, except TurkeyCo, which 
ran its own agency in Portugal.  Importantly, representatives from external employment 
 
 
agencies were not found at any of the sites during the observation period, and so no informal 
interviews were held with them.  Additionally, data were gathered from safety reports at each 
company.  Induction programmes for new starters were attended and, where provided, 
documentary evidence from these sessions was gathered.  Notably, BeerCo was the only 
company at which the author was given any kind of safety induction before entering the 
factory.  This was a requirement for any long-term visitor to the site. 
 
Context 
 
The food manufacturing industry presents a particularly interesting unit of analysis in which 
to investigate workplace experiences of OHS for core, temporary, and agency workers.  In 
the context of a wider shift of risk from capital to labour (Thompson, 2003; 2011), risk of 
variable demand has been passed down the supply chain in food manufacturing.  
Organisations must be considered in a wider context rather than as disconnected entities, and 
the supply chain holds a critical role in the safety of workers.  Greasley and Edwards (2014) 
find that, even where organisations and managers are committed to health and well-being 
interventions, competitive markets can constrain the impacts of these interventions.  Turnbull 
et al. (1993) note that the power disparity in supply chains enables firms to transfer costs and 
risk to smaller suppliers, with Grimshaw et al. (2005) noting that these supplier firms will 
then attempt to transfer this risk on to their individual workers, which has been noted in a 
variety of sectors including haulage (Mayhew and Quinlan, 2006) and shipping (Bhattacharya 
and Tang, 2012).  In some cases, this imbalance of power can be seen as having a positive 
effect on safety, with larger purchasers in the supply chain requiring suppliers to meet their 
standards (Marchington and Vincent, 2004), although these effects may be reduced during 
 
 
times of economic contraction (Robinson, 2010).  In the particular case of the food 
manufacturing sector, this area has recently seen controversy related to interactions between 
the component organisations of the supply chains, as seen in the horsemeat scandal in the 
UK, which saw traces of horse found in ready meals claiming to contain beef (The Guardian, 
2013). 
 
In the particular case of the food manufacturing sector, Lloyd and James (2008) in the UK, 
Hasle and Moller (2007) in Denmark, and Wright and Lund (2003) in Australia note that the 
financial risk of variable demand is often passed on through the use of agency workers.  As 
such, the food manufacturing sector provides a suitable arena for investigating the 
experiences of these workers, and the relationships and potential silos created between the 
constituent companies in supply chains.  Edwards et al. (2009) have noted the cost pressure 
placed on suppliers by increasingly consolidated and powerful supermarkets in the UK, 
particularly on suppliers of generic and substitutable products (see also Newsome et al., 
2009).  This power has led to increased focus on meeting production targets to meet the 
demands of supermarkets on time.  Grimshaw et al. (2005) suggest that a cost-cutting 
response to this increased pressure from powerful purchasers is the use of precarious workers, 
such as those from an agency, transferring risk firstly from powerful supermarkets onto 
suppliers, and from these suppliers onto individual workers.  This use of agency workers 
across organisational boundaries opens the possibility for silos to develop.  Lloyd and James 
(2008) suggest that these pressures from further down the supply chain have an effect on 
health and safety in the food manufacturing industry, with Wright and Lund (1996) noting 
that these workers may attempt to work faster in order to impress managers and secure 
permanent employment, potentially to their own risk. 
 
 
 
Outcomes 
 
This increased use of temporary and agency workers has potential effects on health and safety 
at work, particularly if the four cultural practices noted by Hopkins (2005) are present, for 
example individuals being placed into differing organisational silos based on contractual 
status.  Although Hopkins’ (2005) identification of a culture of on-time running is a literal 
one taken from railways in Australia, there is a focus in food manufacturing on meeting 
production targets and supplying supermarkets on time.  On-time delivery here can be 
considered a form of on-time running.  Given the high incidence of temporary and agency 
work in the food manufacturing sector, and the transference of risk away from supermarkets 
down the supply chain, safety in the this sector provides a particularly interesting study.  
According to the most recently published figures from the HSE, 27 million working days 
were lost to work-related ill-health or injury in the UK in 2012/2013, at an estimated cost of 
£13.8 billion (HSE, 2013b).  Although in 2012/2013 around 10% of the British workforce 
were to be found in manufacturing, this sector accounts for 16% of reported major injuries, 
and 18% of fatal injuries (HSE, 2013a).  Between 2007/8 and 2010/11, 38% of over three-day 
injuries in manufacturing were a result of handling incidents, with the next common cause 
being slips and trips at 19% (HSE, 2013a).  Within the manufacturing sector, food 
manufacturing has the largest number of reported major injuries with 715 reported on average 
each year, at an average rate of 239.9 injuries per 100, 000 employees (HSE, 2013a).  The 
large number of people employed in Food Product and Beverage Manufacturing means that 
this was the sector with the highest reported non-fatal major injury figure, with the average 
annual number from 2005/2006 to 2009/2010 being 908 (HSE, 2011).  When investigating 
 
 
overall health, the HSE reports that each year around 19,000 workers in food and drink 
manufacturing suffer from a health complaint that is exacerbated by work (HSE, 2014b).  The 
HSE also notes that the second most common cause of ill health in food and drink 
manufacture, after back injuries at 35%, is mental ill health at 29% (HSE, 2014b).  This is 
perhaps indicative of the repetitive nature of jobs in the sector, with low levels of control at 
work linked to stress and poor mental health (Karasek 1979; Marmot et al., 1991). 
 
Findings 
 
As would be expected for the sector, the majority of roles in the case study companies were 
monotonous and routine, requiring only for an operator to place some sort of food product 
into a container.  General training for workers in these roles, regardless of their contractual 
status, was limited.  The only exception to this was BeerCo, which had a more complicated 
production process that required workers to be able to work a number of different parts of the 
line.  As a result, there were greater returns to be made by investing in training for 
individuals, and both core and temporary workers were directly employed, rather than 
through an agency.  This temporary worker at BeerCo noted that there had been a number of 
training sessions beyond initial training that he had been able to attend: 
 
Forklift training, then there is all your little stacker truck training so there is always 
something going on.  You have all your little meetings where you have your health and 
safety, PPE training, environmental training, you have meetings were you have to do little 
quizzes on environmental issues, waste, so there is always something that you are taking part 
in…I have done a few courses, I have done videojet [coding system for best before dates, 
batch numbers etc.] training, I have done IOSH training, I have got certificates for quite a few 
of them, manual handling, there must be six or seven courses…The team leader who was 
 
 
over there he said “I can’t see the point of you not doing the training while you’re here, it is 
only going to be beneficial isn’t it?” 
Interview 24 - British Temporary Worker, Male, 40s, BeerCo 
 
At BeerCo, workers did not have to apply to go on these courses, but instead were nominated 
by their managers.  There was little evidence of workers being placed in different silos based 
upon their contractual status, and all worked for the same organisation, again increasing 
communication and co-operation, and reducing antagonism.  This inclusion in training helped 
to remove the barriers between temporary and core permanent workers: 
 
You did all your pasteurisation and things like that, learning about salmonella in the food 
industry, and what diseases can cause health scares.  They were like awareness courses really, 
but you still had to sign to say that you had done it and understood it.  You had questions as 
well which were multiple choice and you ticked them.  So you were still all involved in that 
just like the regular blokes were, you had to do these little courses…You do all that sort of 
thing, team bonding, they don’t shut you out…So you are involved in that as well, you one 
not just pushed aside, “You are just a fixed-term worker so you don’t need to know”, you still 
do everything that a full-time bloke does, any courses that they attend you are obliged to 
attend, so we do get everything that the full-term workers do. 
Interview 24 - British Temporary Worker, Male, 40s, BeerCo 
For these directly-employed temporary workers, some of the barriers to training had been 
removed, reducing the chance of workers on different contractual statuses feeling that they 
were in different silos.  However, one significant distinction that remained, even in the 
strongly unionised BeerCo, was that temporary workers were much less likely to be members 
of the trade union.  This lower level of membership has been found in many previous studies 
(Ackers et al., 1996; Gunningham, 2008), although there is occasional evidence of the 
successful organising of contingent workers (Simms and Dean 2013).  In light of these 
findings, it becomes increasingly important to investigate workplace experiences, particularly 
 
 
for workers who are completing the same tasks, but are engaged through an employment 
agency.  This will be seen in the other case study companies, who employed agency as well 
as directly-employed temporary workers.  As compared to the well-integrated BeerCo, the 
use of agency workers in these four organisations demonstrated Hopkins’ (2005:28) culture 
of silos and were found to be “organisationally and occupationally fragmented”. 
 
Safety at work 
 
At the remaining case study companies greater differences were found between directly-
employed and agency workers.  All of the sites visited reported similar types of safety 
incidents within their factories, mainly slips, trips and falls, and cuts from equipment or 
packaging.  These safety incidents are typical of those found in the food manufacturing 
industry (see, for example HSE, 2011), although TurkeyCo had the additional concern of 
H5N1 avian influenza which had affected a different part of their supply chain in 2007.  Cuts 
were a particular problem at TurkeyCo, where many of the workers used knives, and as these 
became worn down through repeated sharpening there was a higher risk of the point going 
through a worker’s protective chain mail and injuring them.  Although new blades were too 
wide to penetrate this chain mail, it was difficult for workers to know at what stage of 
sharpening the blade would become narrow enough to injure them, and thus they were 
sometimes injured before they requested a new knife.  However, these were considered to be 
minor injuries, both by workers and managers.  There had not been a fatality at any of the 
plants for many years.  Reflecting wider trends (HSE 2014b), injury rates were falling, 
although there was some fluctuation, and different groups, particularly younger workers and 
agency workers, were felt by OHS specialists interviewed to present a higher level of risk.  
 
 
Importantly, however, many of these minor injuries are preventable with basic safety 
induction training, as this overcomes the problems of lack of familiarity with the work 
environment (Lloyd and James, 2008) and lack of knowledge of reporting systems 
(Aronsson, 1999; Johnstone and Quinlan, 2006). 
 
Overall, managers’ views towards whether permanent, directly-employed temporary, or 
agency workers were more likely to have a safety incident were found to be inconsistent.  
Some operations managers suggested that temporary or agency workers were more likely to 
have a safety incident than their permanent colleagues because they were not used to their 
surroundings.  However, others suggested that it was in fact more likely that permanent 
workers would have a safety incident, as their familiarity with their work environment meant 
that they could become complacent and thus less wary of hazards.  Discussions with OHS 
representatives revealed that at none of the sites visited were incident reports distinguished by 
a worker’s contractual status, and thus it is not possible to provide any meaningful statistics 
from these case study companies on whether temporary or agency workers are more likely to 
have a safety incident in the particular case the food manufacturing sector in the UK.  The 
lack of availability of this information may, however, explain some of the variation in 
findings in existing quantitative studies.  As no sites differentiated their reports by contractual 
status it is likely that the data used for quantitative studies into the issue of health and safety 
of short term workers (for example those reviewed by Quinlan et al., 2001; Quinlan, 2003) 
are unreliable. 
 
A culture of silos: safety of directly-employed workers 
 
 
 
Induction training was often found to be patchy at the case study companies and, importantly, 
differing levels of training were given to workers on different types of work contract.  As 
would perhaps be expected for the low skilled roles investigated at each case study company, 
there was little in the way of extensive training for new starters.  Although permanent 
workers received by far the longest workplace induction, even they found that their induction 
did not provide basic information, such as the location of fire escapes: 
 
I wasn’t sure where the fire exits were. I think I asked a line manager and he said “If there is 
a fire just follow me”. 
-[Interviewer] When you started was there any safety training? 
Oh no, no, you’ve just got to put the hat and the blue shoes on.  You have just got to wear 
that and wash your hands, and that was it.  You are on a line, just get on with it. 
Interview 17 - British Permanent Worker, Male, 50s, ChocCo 
 
A number of permanent workers across the sites expressed concern with the level of safety 
training that was being given.  This is perhaps surprising, given not only the importance of 
safety training to the individual, but also to protect the integrity of the product, particularly 
following high profile incidents such as H5N1 avian influenza and the horsemeat scandal.  
Mirroring the situation for core permanent workers, for directly employed temporary workers 
any safety training given was felt to be inadequate: 
 
There was one girl who was my best mate on the line who did induction with me, we would 
just take the piss out the thing because it was so patronising.  They all are, that sort of thing, it 
is not just ours, all of them are.  There was questions like “What do you do if you have just 
 
 
wiped your backside?  Do you (a) pick up the chocolate (b) shake someone’s hand or (c) 
wash your hand?”  And we were sat taking the mickey out of it, so that is how we met. 
Interview 13 - British Temporary Worker, Male, 20s, ChocCo 
 
As noted with ongoing training, little difference was found between induction training for 
directly-employed core and temporary workers.  Despite the obvious concerns over the 
effects of a lack of initial safety training, it would seem from investigating these two types of 
training that the divisions between core and directly-employed temporary workers employed 
directly by these organisations was not significant and barriers between these silos were not 
large.  However, by investigating agency workers, it becomes clear that new divisions in 
training provision between directly-employed and agency workers have formed.  
Demonstrated here are organisationally fragmented workplaces where people work together 
but for different organisations, leading to a culture of silos (Hopkins, 2005) that blurs clarity 
of responsibility (Rubery et al., 2002). 
 
A culture of silos: safety of agency workers 
 
Safety training at induction was found to be different for directly employed and agency 
workers in all the case study companies.  For example, at SpiceCo, agency workers received 
around one hour of induction, whereas permanent workers would have around four hours of 
induction.  Agency staff would be given a quick overview of the changing procedure and how 
to report any incidents, and would then go to the production line to be given on-the-job 
training.  By comparison, permanent workers were taken to a training room and shown videos 
about food safety and pests, and would then receive a tour around the factory before they 
 
 
started.  ReadyCo exhibited perhaps the largest difference between inductions for permanent 
and agency staff.  Permanent workers would receive a 3-4 hour induction in a separate 
training room.  If necessary to the department that they were working in, new starters would 
also be shown videos about allergens.  Agency staff, by contrast, received no company 
induction, with some operations managers not sure who was responsible for safety training 
for new starters: 
 
-[Interviewer] So when the people get to you have the agency given them any food safety 
training or induction? 
I would think the agency would have, I can’t be a hundred percent sure on that. 
Interview 40 - British Operations Manager, Male, 40s, ReadyCo 
 
-[Interviewer] Do they go through any kind of formal induction process? 
Not with me or us, I don’t know if they do with the actual agency company.  Their 
representative will take them down there, they will show them the PPE [personal protective 
equipment] and wash hands and everything so it is more their responsibility to make sure 
they know what they are doing. 
Interview 49 - British Operations Manager, Male, 40s, ReadyCo 
 
This demonstrates Hopkins’ (2005) culture of rules, where procedures are in place and 
workers are held responsible if these are not followed or if, as the second manager states, they 
do not know what they are doing.  The confusion over responsibility matches the findings of 
an HSE report cited by Johnstone and Quinlan (2006), which showed that 80% of agencies 
believed that responsibility for workplace health and safety lay with the host organisation and 
not the agency.  As noted by Howes (2011), it is unclear even legally who is responsible for 
this training.  However, it was clear that in these cases the agency did not always provide a 
safety induction: 
 
 
 
The actual agency should provide them with all the knowledge that they need, for example 
what they can and cannot do in the areas, when they come in they change into boots and they 
have to wear hairnets, they have to wear beard things and things like that.  The agency should 
do that, but we have a problem sometimes when they say that all the guys on the bus have 
been told about what they need to do, and they come to the area and they go into it, and they 
haven’t got a clue.  They haven’t got a clue what to do.  You find that quite a lot of the 
agency that we have, most of the Polish and Slovenian and Estonian and Slovakian, a lot of 
them have not so great English.  They come and they say “We don’t know what to do, we 
don’t know what we are supposed to wear”, and you see someone walking through the 
changing rooms and stepping over the step over, and walking through without a hairnet on, 
you are like “Whoa, come back”. 
Interview 55 - British Operations Manager, Male, 30s, ReadyCo 
 
By relying on the agency to complete the safety induction, it was clear that agency workers 
were being put in danger.  In addition, with a lack of information provided about, for 
example, hand washing, consumers of these products could also be placed at risk.  
Importantly, it was not possible to find any representatives from the agency to discuss this 
with at the case study companies, perhaps indicative of some of the problems faced by 
agency workers when engaged in a triangular employment relationship.  All of the agency 
workers spoken to, regardless of which company they were working at, indicated that they 
felt that their safety inductions were inadequate.  For example, at ReadyCo the agency 
workers reported that they just copied what permanent workers were doing, as described by 
this line leader who had originally started as an agency worker: 
 
-[Interviewer] Because this was a food factory did the agency give you any extra training? 
 
 
No. 
-[Interviewer] So when you got here what health and safety training did you get? 
When I was working for the agency they didn’t give me any training, someone just told you I 
need to wash the hands, and put on the PPE. 
-[Interviewer] Who told you what to do with hand-washing? 
Some permanent people.  When I came here I had to sit in the canteen with all the agency 
people, and someone from the agency came and said “You and you go to this department, and 
you and you go to this department”.  So I was with the people who went to the assembly 
department.  When I go there I look what they are doing and I do the same. 
Interview 50 - Polish Line Leader, Male, 30s, ReadyCo 
 
Agency workers were supposed to receive safety training from their agency, and it was part 
of their contract with the case study companies that this would be completed.  However, 
when speaking to the agency workers about their experiences, it became clear that this was 
not the case: 
 
- [Interviewer] What safety training did you get before you started? 
Safety? 
-[Interviewer] Like emergency stop buttons or how to lift things or where the fire exits are. 
No. 
-[Interviewer] You didn’t get anything like that? 
No. 
Interview 20 - Polish Agency Worker, Female, 20s, ChocCo 
 
-[Interviewer] Because you were working in a food factory rather than at [warehouse] did 
you get any extra training from the agency? 
No, we got some training in [other company’s] warehouse where we also worked from the 
agency, and one of the companies give us extra training in food safety. 
-[Interviewer] But the agency themselves didn’t? 
 
 
No. 
-[Interviewer] And was there any food safety training when you got here? 
No. 
Interview 57 - Polish Agency Worker, Female, 20s, SpiceCo 
 
It was agency workers who were most disconnected from the organisations at which they 
worked, and who received the shortest induction and, with the exception of ChocCo, not 
given a company induction.  Indeed, at each factory the case study organisations were 
attempting to increase the differentiation of their agency workers from their directly-
employed workers.  As an example, agency workers at ReadyCo were given bright orange 
hairnets to distinguish them from white hatted directly-employed workers.  Workers who 
took a job through an agency reported that they were often given different Personal Protective 
Equipment (PPE) to the permanent or directly-employed temporary workers.  In many cases, 
this was not felt to offer the same levels of protection as that given to directly employed 
workers.  For example, at ChocCo agency workers were provided with blue plastic overshoes 
rather than white protective shoes with steel toe caps.  These were felt to provide less 
protection, and also to increase the possibility of a slip or fall as they did not provide as much 
grip.  Unlike permanent workers, agency workers at ReadyCo would share communal 
wellington boots rather than being provided with their own new pair, and the soles on these 
boots were sometimes worn down and slippery. Again, managers were aware that these did 
not provide as much protection even though they were working in a high risk area, but that 
owing to cost pressures and ordering delays, these workers did not have safety shoes: 
 
 
 
They are given shoes straightaway.  Well, maybe not on the first day because you need to 
find their shoe size and order them and it takes a week.  But they are given them because they 
are working in an area that is more susceptible to risk. 
Interview 7 - British Operations Manager, Male, 40s, ChocCo 
 
Demonstrated here, therefore, is not just a culture of risk-blindness, but a risk-denying culture 
(Hopkins, 2005).  Managers were aware that the protective equipment that they were 
providing did not afford as much protection to agency workers, but in an attempt to separate 
them into a different workplace silo, continued to use this anyway. 
 
The diversity of agency workers 
 
As noted previously, the agency workforce is becoming increasingly diverse.  In the United 
Kingdom, a particular factor that has affected this has been migration, particularly from 
central and eastern Europe (Author et al., 2014; Clark and Drinkwater, 2008) following the 
A8 EU expansion of 2004.  As such, the language barrier was a significant issue with agency 
workers.  Whereas directly employed staff would have to prove that they understood English 
to an acceptable level in a job interview, workers with poor English language skills would 
often use the agency as a route around this when seeking work (see also Author, 2009).  This 
meant that managers had to show workers visually rather than explain safety procedures to 
them verbally.  Alternatively, some managers used other bilingual workers to translate for 
them or, if they were from the same country as the new starter, explain to them in their native 
 
 
language.  Perhaps most concerningly, operations managers were aware that these workers’ 
language skills could impact on their safety, but had done nothing to resolve the issue. 
 
-[Interviewer] You’ve never had someone turn up whose English is not good enough to 
understand the Health and Safety? 
Probably yes. [Laughs]  But the agency staff, you find that they have worked in a lot of other 
factories, so they have worked at [local chicken factory] or somewhere else and they have 
picked things up along the way. 
Interview 1 - British Operations Manager, Female, 40s, ChocCo 
 
 
Again here is the demonstration of a risk denying culture, and not just one of risk blindness.  
Overall, agency workers were certainly aware that they were the most disconnected of 
workers in the factories.  In addition to being marked out with different PPE, which often did 
not provide the safety levels of that given to directly employed workers, they also received 
less stability with regards to working hours, and also received lower pay.  The case study 
organisations gave them a shorter induction, and they were excluded from a company 
induction designed to improve their commitment, unless they were at ChocCo, where they 
were expected to attend this for no pay.  Overall, inductions were found to be lacking; where 
centrally designed programmes were in place, these were often found to be puerile, and the 
output pressures placed on line managers meant that they had no time to complete safety 
inductions with a workforce with a rapid turnover.  These operations managers were certainly 
aware that there were weaknesses in the process, from migrant workers who did not 
understand the induction, to agencies who were not providing the inductions that they were 
supposed to.  In this way, they demonstrated not just a blindness to risk, but an active denial 
of risk.  Perhaps most importantly for these manufacturing managers was the culture of on-
 
 
time running and delivery, where requirements to meet production deadlines from powerful 
supermarkets were seen as the key priority.  Increased pressure from supermarkets was 
concentrated on output levels rather than workplace safety, and thus this was the key focus 
for increasingly time-pressured operations managers (see also Lloyd and James 2008; 
Newsome et al. 2009).  With this increased use of agency workers to cope with these 
pressures, divisions in these case study companies were found where people were doing the 
same tasks, but with some directly-employed by the manufacturer and others by an agency.  
Here, where it was unclear who was responsible for managing them, were workers given so 
little training that they were being put at risk. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
The influence of cultural practices on OHS can be examined through culture surveys, major 
accident enquiries, or ethnography (or an ethnographically-informed approach) (Hopkins, 
2006).  In order to investigate the workplace experiences of people undertaking the same 
tasks but working on different contractual statuses, this paper has used a qualitative in-depth 
approach as suggested by Taylor et al. (2010) and Thompson (2011).  Although OHS is a 
crucial area, it has often been overlooked in the past in the literature.  Quinlan (1999), for 
example, has noted that there is often a disconnect between sociologists and industrial 
relations scholars investigating labour markets, and the implications that these have on safety.  
Additionally, when questioning why it is necessary to “bother” with workplace democracy, 
Foley and Polanyi (2006) note that, alongside the traditional arguments based in economics, 
citizenship and ethics, there is also a compelling case based on employee health.  They argue 
that job security is related to both physical and psychological health (see also Author et al., 
 
 
2014), and others such as Lloyd and James (2008), Quinlan et al. (2001) and Quinlan (2003) 
find that precarious work is a factor in workplace safety incidents.  As such, the influence of 
contractual status on workplace experiences of OHS is an area that requires in depth analysis, 
and this paper has endeavoured to fill this research gap. 
 
OHS outcomes were investigated by using an ethnographically informed method to examine 
differences in workplace experiences of core and temporary workers, and also the 
experiences of those working through an employment agency.  When considering training 
provision, there was found to be little difference in the experiences of permanent and 
temporary workers who were directly employed by the case study companies.  This might be 
expected – the majority of roles were low skilled and there were few production gains to be 
made through training as a result of the highly controlled production environment (Stewart, 
1997).  Where significant differences do occur is when agency workers are present.  As noted 
in the literature on fragmenting organisational boundaries (Marchington et al., 2005; 
Marchington and Vincent, 2004; Rubery et al., 2002), individuals may find themselves 
completing tasks alongside people working for a different organisation.  It is here, rather than 
at the boundary between directly employed permanent and directly employed temporary 
(Atkinson, 1985), that new workplace divisions are being created between directly-employed 
and agency workers. 
 
The complexity of supply chains in the food manufacturing industry, coupled with the 
increased power of supermarkets, has seen the use of agency labour grow in the food 
manufacturing sector, with workers hired from agencies on a very short term basis to 
complete low skilled tasks (Edwards et al., 2009).  However, the lines of responsibility for 
 
 
these workers are growing increasingly blurred, and responsibility for providing these 
workers with, for example, safety training is unclear (Howes, 2011).  This paper has 
demonstrated that managers within companies are unclear as to where this responsibility lies, 
and therefore it is at this boundary that workers are failing to receive the necessary induction, 
training or supervision.  A further effect on safety of agency workers is the increasing 
diversity of this group.  As would be expected in production roles, the skill requirements of 
jobs in the case study companies were low.  Indeed, not even a basic level of English 
language skills was required to understand the task.  This heterogeneity of the workforce, 
however, creates further problems for safety in the workplace, as agencies place workers who 
can be shown the task, but do not necessarily understand safety instructions.  In addition, a 
deliberate attempt to differentiate agency workers often led to them receiving inferior PPE, 
also visually reinforcing this new division. 
 
Clearly at these case study companies agency workers faced an increased level of risk.  
Indeed, managers indicated that they were aware of these problems.  An analysis of 
organisational culture as expressed in the collective practices of managers and leaders 
illuminates why these organisations allow these problems to persist.  By investigating the 
four cultural practices identified by Hopkins (2005), it is possible to analyse why these 
outcomes are accepted within these companies.  Hopkins (2005) suggests that four key 
factors are responsible for the organisational culture that can lead to severe OHS issues – a 
rule-focussed culture, a risk-blind or even risk-denying culture, a culture of punctuality and 
on-time running, and a culture of silos.  These factors can be seen in a number of large-scale 
incidents – Hopkins (2005), for example, notes the examples of the Glenbrook and Ladbroke 
Grove railway disasters, whilst Vaughan (1996) draws similar conclusions from the 
Challenger space shuttle disaster. 
 
 
 
Rather than a major accident enquiry, however, this study sought to investigate the food 
manufacturing industry using an ethnographically-informed method (Hopkins, 2006).  
Although no major incident had yet occurred in these organisations, the four cultures noted 
by Hopkins (2005) were all present.  These were firstly a rule-focussed culture, with an 
assumption that workers were responsible for their own safety within the rules that had been 
created.  There was certainly evidence of a risk-blind or even risk-denying culture, where 
managers knew that the protective equipment that they provided to agency workers was not 
as effective, but continued with its use anyway.  A culture of punctuality and on-time running 
meant a focus on production targets and delivering to customers on time above safety.  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a culture of silos across organisational boundaries, 
coupled with the context of a weak legal framework of responsibility, meant that many of 
these workers simply received no safety supervision or training at all. 
 
Through in-depth investigation, this study has been able to show the extent to which divisions 
in the workplace have shifted.  When considering OHS, the division is not amongst directly 
employed workers at the core and temporary boundary (Atkinson, 1985; Burgess, 1997; 
Quinlan, 1999).  It is where workers have different employers that differences occur (Rubery 
et al., 2002), and the evidence from this study is that these differences are putting workers in 
low-skilled roles at risk (see also Lloyd and James, 2008; Quinlan et al., 2001; Quinlan, 
2003).  Having illuminated this confusion in responsibility at a workplace level, it is now of 
crucial importance for policy makers to ensure that this responsibility is clarified to ensure 
that these agency workers receive the induction, equipment, training and supervision they 
require to ensure their safety in the workplace (Howes, 2011). 
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Table 1 
 
 ChocCo BeerCo ReadyCo SpiceCo TurkeyCo 
i. Number of 
permanent 
manufacturing 
workers 
1000 600 350 80 1200 
ii. Max. number of 
directly-employed 
temporary 
manufacturing 
workers 
400 50 0 0 600 
iii. Max. number of 
agency 
manufacturing 
workers 
100 0 150 15 0 
iv. Pay differential 
for directly-
employed workers 
+3% N/A +5% +2% N/A 
v. Agency workers 
sourced from 
A8, local N/A A8, local A8 Portugal 
(internal 
agency) 
vi. Typical length 
of short term work 
Up to six 
months 
Up to nine 
months 
Weekly Monthly Six to eight 
weeks 
vii. Approx. trade 
union membership 
amongst permanent 
workers 
None 98% None None 30% 
viii. Examples of 
alternative PPE for 
agency workers 
Overalls, shoes N/A Overalls, 
wellingtons, 
hats 
Overalls Overalls, 
wellingtons, 
hats 
 
